I. Overview

If current trends continue, the demographic profile of the United States will modify dramatically past the centre of this century, according to new population projections developed by the Pew Research Center.1

The nation's population volition rise to 438 million in 2050, from 296 million in 2005, and fully 82% of the growth during this catamenia volition be due to immigrants arriving from 2005 to 2050 and their descendants. (Figure 1)

Of the 117 million people added to the population during this catamenia due to the result of new immigration, 67 million volition be the immigrants themselves, 47 million will be their children and 3 one thousand thousand will be their grandchildren.

The Centre's projections bespeak that near one in v Americans (19%) will be foreign built-in in 2050, well to a higher place the 2005 level of 12%, and also surpassing the historic peaks for immigrants as a share of the U.South. population—xiv.8% in 1890 and 14.seven% in 1910. (Figure 2)

By 2050, the nation's racial and ethnic mix will look quite dissimilar than it does now. Non-Hispanic whites, who made upwardly 67% of the population in 2005, will be 47% in 2050. Hispanics will ascension from xiv% of the population in 2005 to 29% in 2050. Blacks were 13% of the population in 2005 and volition be roughly the same proportion in 2050. Asians, who were five% of the population in 2005, will be 9% in 2050.

Clearing is projected to be the key driver of national population growth in the coming half century, but information technology is of import to note that possible hereafter changes in clearing policy or other events could essentially modify the projected totals. These projections are based on trends over the past half century, during which immigration, both authorized and unauthorized, has played an escalating role in U.S. population growth. From 1960 to 2005, new immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants accounted for 51% of population increase. In the subsequently part of that flow, from 1980 to 2005, new immigration deemed for 58% of the 68 one thousand thousand boosted people.

For the period from 2005-2050, new immigrants and their descendants will account for 82% of population increase. The contribution of new immigration to population change was derived past comparison our main projection with an alternative project that assumes no new immigrants get in later on 2005. (See Contribution of Clearing to Population Alter in Appendix.)

The heightening role of immigration contrasts with a subtract in fertility in contempo decades. The average number of births per adult female has declined markedly since the tardily 1950s, from more 3.5 then to about 2 at present. Besides, a smaller proportion of women are of childbearing age now, compared with earlier decades. These two changes have made immigration a more prominent factor in population growth.

Methods and Assumptions

The Heart's projections for the period from 2005 to 2050 are based on detailed assumptions near patterns in births, deaths and clearing—the three edifice blocks of population change. All population projections have built in uncertainties, especially for years further in the futurity, because they are based on assumptions about future behavior. In addition, these uncertainties tin multiply because key aspects of population alter are often interrelated—for example, a refuse in immigration could as well lead to a decline in the birthrate because immigrants tend to have larger families than do native built-in residents.
The Center has developed three different population projections for 2050, but the body of this report presents findings from the chief project (figures from projections based on lower or higher immigration levels are set forth in a section that starts on page 23). These projections consolidate and build upon past trends, present conditions, and factors affecting futurity behavior.

None of the projections should be treated as predictions. The country's policies may alter, as may the factors that influence birth, expiry and clearing rates. Even given these caveats, yet, population projections are an important belittling tool for planners. A rise or turn down in the overall population—too as in detail age groups—will have of import impacts on the nation's taxation base and workforce. Demographic change has major implications for regime spending in key areas such as schools, health programs, community services, infrastructure and Social Security. Projections also provide business organisation with a ground upon which to make judgments well-nigh future markets. And they are of increasing interest because of the part that population may play in climate change and other environmental concerns.

A Note on Methodology

The Center'due south projections use well established demographic methods and models to carry the population forrad in fourth dimension. The models and assumptions are disaggregated past race and past Hispanic origin, every bit are many projection models (due east.k., Census Bureau, 2000). With regard to immigration, the Center's projections also incorporate methods developed by Edmonston and Passel (1992, 1994) that differentiate the population by generation, i.e., the offset generation (foreign-built-in), the second generation (U.S. natives with at to the lowest degree ane immigrant parent) and the third-and-higher generations (U.Southward. native children of ii U.Due south. native-built-in parents). For more item, see the "Methodology" Appendix to this study.

When incorporating birth estimates into the projections, the Center has assumed that the overall fertility rate will remain near the level it has been for the by three decades, with differing rates by race and ethnicity (Appendix, Figure A2). Birthrates are assumed to be well above average for immigrants, slightly above average overall for the second generation (U.S. natives with at to the lowest degree one immigrant parent) and below average for subsequent generations born in the United States. The Middle'due south fertility rate projections are well-nigh identical to those of the Social Security trustees and slightly lower than those of the Census Bureau. (Census Bureau, 2004; Social Security Administration, 2007).

As for death rates, life expectancy is assumed to improve somewhat for all groups throughout the menstruation covered by these projections. (Appendix, Figure A3) The Heart'south projections employ Census Bureau assumptions virtually life expectancy gains, which are higher than those of the Social Security Trustees.

Immigration to the United States has risen rapidly and steadily for decades equally a event of increasing globalization and population movements, changes in U.S. immigration laws, the growing linkages of immigrant families within this country to communities away and labor market factors. Not only have the numbers of new U.S. immigrants increased over contempo periods, but the rate of clearing as well has risen steadily, whether measured from 1930, 1960 or 1980. In the face of these stiff and persistent trends, most U.S. government projections, whether done by the Demography Bureau (1996, 2000, 2004) or the Social Security Administration (2007) have assumed abiding or fifty-fifty decreasing numbers of immigrants, implying sharp and sometimes immediate declines in the rate of clearing. Every bit a result, official projections over the last several decades have consistently underestimated actual population growth.

The Pew Enquiry Center projections have assumed that the annual immigration level, now nearly 1.4 million people, will increase slowly by i% per twelvemonth, reaching ii.1 million immigrants in 2050. (Figure iii)

This rate of growth is in line with, only somewhat slower than, the growth trends of the last several decades. These immigration levels are slightly higher than those projected by either the Demography Bureau or the Social Security Trustees in the short run and substantially higher toward the end of the projection horizon.

With the Center'southward immigration assumption, the charge per unit of immigration remains roughly constant over the 45-year project horizon at 0.48% per yr, or only under 5 immigrants per 1,000 population for each year. The rate is slightly below the rate for the first half of this decade and equal to the average for the last 35 years. (Figure four)

The decades-long blueprint of steady increases has been interrupted recently by year-to-year variation, including a spike in 1998-2001, a sharp pass up in 2002-2004 (Passel and Suro, 2005), followed by a return to the long-term average in the last several years. The relatively steady growth of the concluding 70 years contrasts with substantial fluctuations that occurred in the 19th and early 20th centuries. (Figure v)

Brusk-term fluctuations are likely to continue to occur, but the Heart's projections assume that those variations will be less important than the long-term trends. Although the charge per unit is held steady in the Middle's projections, the number of new immigrants rises as the nation's total population goes up. The projections too assume that several hundred thousand foreign-born residents will go out each twelvemonth, which is in keeping with trends of the past several decades. Reflecting recent trends, the Heart's projections include a mix of new arrivals of legal permanent residents and unauthorized, or illegal, migrants, although the ii groups are not broken out separately.

The event of illegal immigration has become highly contentious in recent years. Last summer, Congress tried only failed to pass a comprehensive reform bill, and the debate over how to change immigration policies has get a major topic of the current presidential campaign. It is possible that a hereafter Congress will enact laws that would sharply cutting immigration flows. This has happened before. The Immigration Act of 1924 (forth with an economical low and a world state of war) drastically reduced immigrants equally a share of the U.S. population from a 20th century peak of xiv.7% in 1910 to a depression of 4.vii% in 1970.

This report offers two alternative population projections in add-on to its main projection. The alternatives are based on immigration levels roughly 50% above and l% below the baseline projection, just use the same fertility and mortality assumptions equally the baseline projection. Nether the lower-clearing scenario, the population would rise to 384 one thousand thousand in 2050, and new immigration would account for 71% of growth during the projections flow. Under the higher-clearing scenario, the population would become upward to 496 million, and new clearing would business relationship for 87% of the increase. The baseline project shows the population will rising to 438 million, and new immigration volition account for 82% of the increase.

The Center's chief projection indicates that the nation's population will grow 48% over the 2005–2050 period. That growth rate is lower than the 64% increase in the nation's population from 1960 through 2005. The projected annual growth rate of 0.9% equals that of the 1980s but is lower than the pace of growth during other decades since the 1960s.

The Center's projections also indicate that between 2005 and 2050 the number of elderly will increase more chop-chop than either the number of children or working-historic period adults.ii Immigration and births to immigrants in the U.s. volition be responsible for all growth of other age groups only volition have little bear upon on the number of elderly, which is affected mainly by the aging of the post-World War II baby-smash generation.

The human relationship between the size of the working-age population, on the ane paw, and the young and elderly on the other hand, is sometimes referred to as a nation's "dependency ratio." The Center's projections show that the dependency ratio, which was 59 young and elderly for every 100 people of working age in 2005, will rise to 72 dependents per 100 people of working historic period in 2050. That means the costs per worker to support the young and elderly would become up. Nether a lower-immigration scenario, the ratio would rising even higher, to 75 dependents per 100 people of working age. Nether a higher-immigration scenario, it would exist 69 dependents per 100 working-age people.

In terms of international comparisons, the United states volition keep to be the globe's third most populous nation in 2050, behind India and China, each with more a billion people (Un, 2007). The projected almanac growth rate for the Us will continue to exceed that in most other developed nations, which are growing at a slower pace, if at all. European countries generally are growing at no more than 0.5% a year, and some are losing population.

As is true in the United States, the immigrant populations in many other adult nations have been growing chop-chop in recent decades. The United States has a larger foreign-born population than whatever other land, but U.Due south. immigrants were a smaller share of the 2005 population (12%) than those in a few countries with long histories of receiving immigrants—including Australia at 20% or Canada with xix% (United nations, 2006). Although immigrants are a larger share of the U.S. population than in virtually of Europe, some countries have a share of immigrants approaching that of the U.s., including French republic (eleven%) and the United Kingdom (9%).

This study begins past presenting the baseline projection for the total population from 2005 to 2050. The adjacent sections go into particular about the projected estimates for cardinal segments of the population, including the foreign born, Hispanics, blacks, Asians, non-Hispanic whites, working-age adults, children and the elderly. This report then examines how these changes will bear upon the size of the potential workforce relative to the number of elderly and young people. A last section presents the results of two alternative projections. This overview concludes with a summary of major projections.

Racial and Ethnic Groups

In the Center's projections, each person is included in only ane race or Hispanic category. These projections assume that definitions of race and indigenous categories will remain fixed and that self-identification does not modify over time. In reality, the growing numbers of births to parents of different racial and indigenous groups, too every bit irresolute social norms almost racial and ethnic self-identification, are serving to blur the boundaries of racial/ethnic categories. Consequently, the future sizes of race/ethnic groups could be higher or lower than the projection values fifty-fifty if the underlying demographic assumptions nigh the future prove to be correct.

Key Projections

Population and Immigration

  • Between 2005 and 2050, the nation'southward population will increase to 438 million from 296 million, a rise of 142 1000000 people that represents growth of 48%.
  • Immigrants who arrive later on 2005, and their U.Southward.-born descendants, account for 82% of the projected national population increase during the 2005–2050 menstruum.
  • Of the 117 boosted people attributable to the effect of new immigration, 67 meg will be the immigrants themselves and 50 1000000 will be their U.S.-born children and grandchildren
  • The nation'due south foreign-born population, 36 million in 2005, is projected to rise to 81 million in 2050, growth of 129%.
  • In 2050, nearly i in five Americans (nineteen%) will be an immigrant, compared with i in 8 at present (12% in 2005).
  • The strange-born share of the nation's population will exceed celebrated highs onetime between 2020 and 2025, when it reaches 15%. The historic superlative share was 14.7% in 1910 and fourteen.8% in 1890.
  • Births in the United States will play a growing role in Hispanic and Asian population growth, and then a diminishing proportion of both groups volition be foreign-born.

Racial and Ethnic Groups

  • The Hispanic population, 42 million in 2005, will rise to 128 million in 2050, tripling in size. Latinos will be 29% of the population, compared with 14% in 2005. (Figure 6) Latinos will business relationship for threescore% of the nation'southward population growth from 2005 to 2050.
  • The blackness population, 38 meg in 2005, will grow to 59 million in 2050, a ascension of 56%. In 2050, the nation'southward population volition be 13.4% blackness, compared with 12.8% in 2005.
  • The Asian population, 14 million in 2005, will grow to 41 million in 2050, well-nigh tripling in size. In 2050, the nation's population will exist 9% Asian, compared with 5% in 2005. Most Asians in the United States were strange born in 2005 (58%), just by 2050, fewer than one-half (47%) will be.
  • The white, non-Hispanic population, 199 million in 2005, volition grow to 207 one thousand thousand in 2050, a four% increment. In 2050, 47% of the U.S. population will be non-Hispanic white, compared with 67% in 2005.

Age Groups

  • The working-age population—adults ages 18 to 64—will reach 255 million in 2050, upward from 186 million in 2005. This segment will grow more slowly over the project catamenia (37%) than the overall population. Future immigrants and their descendants will account for all growth in this group.
  • Among working-historic period adults, the foreign-born share, 15% in 2005, will rise to 23% in 2050. The Hispanic share, 14% in 2005, will increment to 31% in 2050. The non-Hispanic white share, 68% in 2005, will decline to 45% in 2050.
  • The nation's population of children ages 17 and younger will rising to 102 one thousand thousand in 2050, up from 73 meg in 2005. The child population will abound more slowly in future decades (39%) than will the overall population. Future immigrants and their descendants volition account for all growth in this population segment.
  • Amid children, the share who are immigrants or who have an immigrant parent volition rise to 34% in 2050 from 23% in 2005. The share of children who are Hispanic, twenty% in 2005, will rise to 35% in 2050. Not-Hispanic whites, who make up 59% of today'due south children, volition be 40% of children in 2050.
  • The nation's elderly population—people ages 65 and older—will grow to 81 million in 2050, upward from 37 million in 2005. This group will abound more rapidly than the overall population, and then its share will increase to 19% in 2050, from 12% in 2005. (Effigy 7) Immigration will account for but a pocket-sized function of that growth.
  • The dependency ratio—the number of people of working historic period, compared with the number of young and elderly—will rise sharply, mainly considering of growth in the elderly population. There were 59 children and elderly people per 100 adults of working historic period in 2005. That will rise to 72 dependents per 100 adults of working age in 2050. (Figure eight)

Alternative Projection Scenarios

  • Under a lower-immigration scenario, the total population would ascension to 384 million, the foreign-born share would stabilize at 13% and the Hispanic share would become up to 26% in 2050.
  • Under a higher-immigration scenario, the total population would ascent to 496 meg, the foreign-born share would rise to 23% and the Hispanic share would go up to 32% in 2050.
  • Under a lower- or higher-immigration scenario, the dependency ratio would range from 75 dependents per 100 people of working age to 69 dependents per 100 people of working age. Both of these ratios are well above the current value of 59 dependents per 100 people of working age.

A Note on Terminology

The terms "Hispanic" and "Latino" are used interchangeably in this report.

The terms "whites" "blacks" and "Asians" are used to refer to the non-Hispanic components of each population.

"Children" refers to people ages 17 and younger.

"Working-age" refers to people ages xviii 64.

"Elderly" refers to people ages 65 and older.

"Foreign-born" refers to an individual who is not a U.S. citizen at nascence or, in other words, who is born outside the U.Due south., Puerto Rico or other U.South. territories and whose parents are not U.S. citizens. The terms "strange-built-in" and "immigrant" are used interchangeably.

The terms "unauthorized immigrants," "undocumented immigrants" and "illegal immigrants" are used interchangeably.

This study uses the post-obit definitions of the commencement, 2nd and third-and-college generations:

  • Showtime: Foreign-born or immigrant.
  • Second: U.South. native (born in the Us or territories), with at least one commencement-generation parent.
  • Third-and-higher: U.Due south. native (born in the The states or territories), with both parents native-born.